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WAS ARISTOTLE A VIRTUE ARGUMENTATION THEORIST?
ANDREW ABERDEIN∗
Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) emphasize the roles arguers play in
the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers’
acquired dispositions of character, that is, virtues and vices. The inspiration for
VTA lies in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics, the latter being a modern
revival of Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is also, of course, the father of Western
logic and argumentation. This paper asks to what degree Aristotle may thereby
be claimed as a forefather by VTA.
A tempting way of addressing this question might be to say that since Aristotle
was a virtue theorist and an argumentation theorist, surely he must have been a
virtue argumentation theorist! But not only is this an invalid argument, it is not
even clear that the premisses are true. There is no word corresponding exactly to
‘argumentation’ in Aristotle: λìγος is too broad; συλλογισµäς is too narrow (Rapp
and Wagner, 2013, 15). So, although Aristotle wrote about many aspects of what
we now describe as argumentation, we cannot infer that he conceptualized these
aspects as comprising a single field. What’s more, even the familiar perception of
Aristotle as paradigm virtue ethicist is open to challenge (Santas, 1997). So, taken
as a purely historical question, the answer to my title must be no. However, my
project is an anachronistic one: I hope to demonstrate that a careful reading of
some of Aristotle’s work on argumentation is of enduring relevance to VTA.
The roots of VTA lie in much grander projects, which I survey briefly in §1. §2
turns to what Aristotle has to say about the relationship of character to argument,
and how that may be of use to VTA. §3 addresses one of those things that holds
particular promise for VTA: the status of the phronimos as ideal arguer.
1. What are virtue theories of argumentation?
I have made a point of referring to virtue theories of argumentation in the
plural, since, despite its youth and comparatively small scale, the programme has
been undertaken in several distinct ways. That heterogeneity owes something to
the range of inspirations behind VTA, three of which I survey below.
1.1. Virtue epistemology. One big question confronting any virtue theorist is
“What counts as a virtue?”. In virtue epistemology, the standard way of splitting
up the possible answers is between reliabilist and responsibilist virtues (Axtell,
1997). The former are most often associated with Ernest Sosa, who includes as
virtues many things which don’t much look like virtues, such as the faculty of
sight (Sosa, 1991). Reliabilist virtues are involuntary, but reliable, knowledge-
producing processes. They stand in contrast to responsibilist virtues, notably
proposed by Linda Zagzebski (1996). These virtues, such as open-mindedness,
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look more like ethical virtues. They are voluntarily exercised aspects of charac-
ter that require conscious effort of will. Many virtue epistemologists incorporate
both types of virtue into a mixed approach (for example, Battaly, 2008). When we
turn to argumentation, the roll call of virtues may look much the same. Maybe
there are argumentation-specific virtues that need to be added. Conversely, some
virtues lack obvious relevance to argumentation, so may be downplayed. Or per-
haps we will need to specifically fine-tune the virtues for argumentation: open-
mindedness in arguing and open-mindedness in knowing are not necessarily the
same thing, for example (Cohen, 2009, 57). But VTA need not depend on novel
virtues for novelty. And the disputes over precisely which virtues to include seem
to closely track their counterparts in virtue epistemology.
The other main dimension distinguishing virtue theories concerns the choice of
project. For epistemology, this is a distinction between ‘classical’ projects address-
ing core questions such as “What is knowledge?”; and projects addressing more
neglected questions, such as “What is the value of knowledge?”. Some virtue
epistemologists just focus on the former, by trying to find a virtue response to the
standard questions; some just look at the latter, trying to see what virtue epis-
temology can say about the neglected questions; some people apply the virtue
apparatus to both sorts of project. The classical project of argumentation does
not ask “What is the nature of knowledge?”, it asks “What distinguishes good
argument from bad argument?”. But there are neglected questions in argumenta-
tion theory too: questions about the value of argumentation, and what makes an
argument truly satisfying; about how arguments contribute to human flourish-
ing, and whether we need a more eudaimonistic conception of argument. Once
again, one can pursue both projects, as I have tried to do in my own contributions
to VTA. Many other people who have some allegiance with VTA focus exclusively
on the neglected questions. That is an understandable choice, since it is where
the most obvious dividends lie, but I maintain that a more ambitious project is
defensible (for a taxonomy of such projects, see Paglieri, 2015, 77).
Returning to the question of which virtues to follow, let us review some core
virtues of virtue epistemology to see if we can appropriate them for argumen-
tation. Heather Battaly lists as “paradigm” reliabilist virtues “sense perception,
induction, deduction, and memory” (Battaly, 2008, 644). Induction and deduc-
tion have an obvious relevance to argumentation. Indeed, they lend themselves
to what one might call ‘easy road’ VTA: accept these as virtues, and any account
of argument becomes a virtue theory, but in the trivial sense that if deductive and
inductive reasoning are virtues then every theory of reasoning is a virtue theory.
This may be an unilluminating approach to VTA (but for further discussion, see
Aberdein, 2018). It seems that any sufficiently interesting VTA will not be strictly
reliabilist, but will also recognize some responsibilist virtues. Indeed, Zagzebski’s
Virtues of the Mind, although a work in epistemology, not argumentation theory,
proposes several virtues that look like virtues of argument. She actually includes
“fairness in evaluating the arguments of others”, while virtues such as “intellec-
tual humility” are certainly important to argumentation; likewise “thinking of
coherent explanations” and “being able to recognize reliable authority” (Zagzeb-
ski, 1996, 114). Such virtues could contribute to an understanding of the value of
argument. Perhaps they can also recapture the idea of cogency, of what makes
arguments good ones. One way such a project might get off the ground would be
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to define a cogent argument as an argument that a virtuous arguer would make
in relevant circumstances and then cash out what a virtuous arguer looks like in
terms of the virtues they would need.
1.2. Critical Thinking Dispositions. If one root of VTA lies in contemporary
epistemology, another lies in education. Some of the earliest treatments of critical
thinking in educational theory framed it solely in terms of skills. More sophisti-
cated accounts argued that skills should be supplemented with dispositions: ten-
dencies or inclinations to actually use these skills in a way that fosters successful
critical thinking. In the hands of such pioneers as Robert Ennis and Peter Facione,
this work led to detailed inventories of critical thinking dispositions and instru-
ments whereby they could be assessed (Ennis, 1996; Facione, 2000). The debate
whether or not mastery of critical thinking involves the inculcation of disposi-
tions was won by the advocates of dispositions: “Virtually all the major theorists
of critical thinking . . . make dispositions central to their accounts” (Bailin and
Siegel, 2003, 193). This early research was conducted significantly in advance of
the emergence of VTA, and seldom drew a direct connection to the use of virtues
in other nearby fields, such as epistemology. Nonetheless, the dispositions in
question look a lot like virtues. After all, we follow Aristotle in defining a virtue
as a disposition (Aristotle, 1976, 1106b35), and these specific dispositions have
quite virtue-like qualities:
The primary disposition consists in valuing good reasoning and
being disposed to seek reasons, to assess them, and to govern
beliefs and actions on the basis of such assessment. In addi-
tion, most theorists outline a subset of dispositions that are also
necessary for critical thinking, including open-mindedness, fair-
mindedness, independent-mindedness, an inquiring attitude, and
respect for others in group inquiry and deliberation (Bailin and
Siegel, 2003, 183).
Here’s a more extensive list from Robert Ennis, the doyen of critical thinking
literature:
(1) Care that their beliefs be true, and that their decisions be justified; that is,
care to “get it right” to the extent possible, or at least care to do the best they
can. This includes the interrelated dispositions to do the following:
(a) Seek alternatives (hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources),
and be open to them;
(b) Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified
by the information that is available;
(c) Be well-informed; and
(d) Seriously consider points of view other than their own.
(2) Represent a position honestly and clearly (theirs as well as others’). This
includes the dispositions to do the following:
(a) Be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or other-
wise communicated, seeking as much precision as the situation requires;
(b) Determine, and maintain focus on, the conclusion or question;
(c) Seek and offer reasons;
(d) Take into account the total situation; and
(e) Be reflectively aware of their own basic beliefs.
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(3) Care about the dignity and worth of every person. This includes the disposi-
tions to:
(a) Discover and listen to others’ view and reasons;
(b) Take into account others’ feelings and level of understanding, avoiding in-
timidating or confusing others with their critical thinking prowess;
and
(c) Be concerned about others’ welfare (Ennis, 1996, 171)
Much of this looks as much like ethics as epistemology. But so it should: argu-
mentation straddles the two. Argumentation obviously has connections to epis-
temology, in so far as it is a source of justification for our beliefs; but it also, since
it involves interacting with other people, raises questions about how to do that
in the best way. So the interpersonal nature of argumentation requires ethical as
well as epistemic virtues.
1.3. Virtues of argument. VTA emerged in the 2000s, with its own sets of virtues.
Daniel Cohen, probably the best-known advocate of VTA, proposes four basic
virtues: willingness to engage in serious argumentation; willingness to listen to
others; willingness to modify one’s own position; willingness to question the
obvious (Cohen, 2005, 64). Cohen’s account is Aristotelian at least in the sense
that his virtues are all situated as means between vices of deficiency or excess.
This yields a rogue’s gallery of bad arguers, some of them quite recognizable
types: for example, the Concessionaire concedes things too readily; the Deaf
Dogmatist never listens to anyone; the Eager Believer believes whatever they’re
told; and the Unassuring Assurer assures you of things in a way that makes you
doubt what you otherwise wouldn’t (for the full picture, see Aberdein, 2016, 416).
My own list of virtues was directly inspired by Cohen’s:
(1) willingness to engage in argumentation
(a) being communicative
(b) faith in reason
(c) intellectual courage
(i) sense of duty
(2) willingness to listen to others
(a) intellectual empathy
(i) insight into persons
(ii) insight into problems
(iii) insight into theories
(b) fairmindedness
(i) justice
(ii) fairness in evaluating the arguments of others
(iii) open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence
(c) recognition of reliable authority
(d) recognition of salient facts
(i) sensitivity to detail









(4) willingness to question the obvious





(iii) thoroughness (Aberdein, 2010, 175).
(1), (2), (3), and (4) are Cohen’s virtues, but their subdivisions are from other
sources (in particular, Zagzebski, 1996, 114). Elsewhere, I have also presented
these virtues as means between vices (Aberdein, 2016, 416). Despite the hierar-
chical structure of this list, I do not mean to imply that any such taxonomy of
virtues could ever be definitive. But, although many of the details of this list are
open to dispute, it at least indicates how closely intertwined VTA can be with
more traditional accounts of virtue.
2. What does Aristotle say about character and argument?
In exploring Aristotle’s potential as a precursor of VTA, two broad strategies
present themselves. One option would be to analyse Aristotle’s own argumen-
tational practice for traces of an implicit virtue theory. I shall not take that tack
in this paper (but, for an example of how this might work, applied to Plato, see
Aikin and Anderson, 2006). The other prospect is to examine what Aristotle ex-
plicitly asserts about argumentation. This significantly narrows the focus of the
enquiry: Aristotle has a lot to say about virtue and character, but little of it is
in the context of logic. Indeed, I am aware of no direct virtue references in any
of his works on formal logic (the Categories, On Interpretation, or the Prior Analyt-
ics). However, the Topics and the Rhetoric, where he addresses informal logic, are
richer sources.
2.1. Topics VIII. The Topics is an early work and focussed on a somewhat artificial
task: success in competitive debate exercises intended for students. This may
raise the concern that any insights gleaned from it will be of narrow application.
However, as Sara Rubinelli remarks, “as a result of designing this method, which
basically comprises the rules of a game, [Aristotle] created the first treatise on
argumentation theory of the Western world!” (Rubinelli, 2009, 7). Catarina Dutilh
Novaes goes further, arguing that rethinking the normativity of logic in explicitly
dialogical terms, thereby essentially returning to the perspective of the Topics,
provides a more attractive account of the relationship of logic to reasoning than
the more familiar monological picture (Dutilh Novaes, 2015, 596).
There is not a great deal of discussion of character or virtue in the Topics, but
there are some significant passages. I shall focus on four.
With regard to the giving of answers, we must first define what
is the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The
business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to
make the answerer utter the most extravagant paradoxes that
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necessarily follow because of his position: while that of the an-
swerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible
for the absurdity or paradox, but only his position: for one may,
perhaps, distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong
position to start with, and that of not maintaining it properly,
when once taken up (Aristotle, 1984, 159a16–24).
Here Aristotle addresses the contrasting strengths of the two parties to the sort of
semi-formal debate he is discussing: the questioner and answerer, or proponent
and respondent. Although he does not invoke virtue directly here, he does dis-
cuss what is required to play each role well. He also draws a distinction between
the arguer and the position defended by the arguer; something characteristically
overlooked in much argumentation theory, but of greater salience in VTA. This
distinction is also key to the following passage:
He [the answerer] should beware of maintaining an implausible
hypothesis . . . which a bad character would choose, and which
[is] opposed to men’s wishes (e.g. that pleasure is the good, and
that to do injustice is better than to suffer it). For people then hate
him, supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of argu-
ment but because he really thinks them (Aristotle, 1984, 160b17–
23).
On the one hand, this passage stresses the importance to the arguer of not being
thought vicious, or in other words, of (being seen as) arguing as a virtuous arguer
would argue, a core principle of VTA, as we have seen. On the other hand, the
emphasis is firmly on the vicious aspects of the hypothesis, not the argument by
which that hypothesis is defended, so this is not a virtuistic analysis of argument
as such. Moreover, it is presented in instrumental terms: implausible hypotheses
are to be avoided for fear of reputational damage, not because they are inherently
wrong. However, the concern with reputation is consistent with its playing a role
in argument evaluation. More specifically, it raises a question that has recently
attracted interest from a VTA perspective: can a virtuous arguer be a devil’s
advocate? (Cohen and Stevens, 2019; see also Callard, 2019).
There is more in Topics VIII about bad argumentational practice, some of it
perhaps inveterate, and thereby rising to the level of vice:
Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker
and not his thesis, when the answerer lies in wait for the points
that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well:
when people lose their tempers in this way, their argument be-
comes contentious, not dialectical (Aristotle, 1984, 161a21–23).
Focussing the attack on the speaker indicates that Aristotle sees ad hominem
tactics as at least sometimes justified. This is a prerequisite for VTA, since ap-
praising arguments in terms of the arguers’ characters cannot get off the ground
if all such appraisal is deemed fallacious (see Aberdein, 2014, 89, in which I argue
that ad hominem arguments are legitimate if and only if they address specifically
argumentational character flaws).
Other passages suggest more strongly that some arguers are more prone to
bad practice than others, again reinforcing an analysis of argument in terms of
vices:
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Do not argue with every one, nor practise upon the man in the
street; for there are some people with whom any argument is
bound to degenerate. For against any one who is ready to try all
means in order to seem not to be beaten, it is indeed fair to try
all means of bringing about one’s conclusion; but it is not good
form [εÖσχηµον]. Therefore the best rule is, not lightly to engage
with the man in the street, or bad argument is sure to result. For
you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from
contentious argument (Aristotle, 1984, 164b7–15).
As Robin Smith paraphrases, “The problem with engaging in this kind of argu-
ment is that it encourages bad habits of argumentation” (Smith, 1997, 163). This
concern to avoid bad argument, even at the cost of avoiding arguing altogether,
foreshadows an important theme in VTA of attending closely to the value of ar-
guments, and more specifically contradicts the Socratic commonplace that one
should never give up on arguing (see Campolo, 2019, 721; cf. Aberdein, 2019).
2.2. Rhetoric I. The Rhetoric is a richer source for insights relevant to VTA than
the Topics. I shall concentrate on two passages, one from I.2, one from II.1. I
should reiterate that I am quarrying Aristotle, not proposing a definitive read-
ing. Indeed, some scholars suggest that the Rhetoric exhibits traces of more than
one stage of Aristotle’s thought, and therefore cannot sustain such a reading (let
alone a synoptic reading with Aristotle’s other virtue theoretic texts) (Forten-
baugh, 1992, 232 ff.).
Of those proofs that are furnished through the speech there are
three kinds. Some reside in the character of the speaker, some in
a certain disposition of the audience and some in the speech itself,
through its demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate. Proofs
from character are produced, whenever the speech is given in
such a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence—we
more readily and sooner believe reasonable men on all matters
in general and absolutely on questions where precision is impos-
sible and two views can be maintained. But this effect too must
come about in the course of the speech, not from the speaker’s
being believed in advance to be of a certain character. Unlike
some experts, we do not exclude the speaker’s reasonable image
from the art as contributing nothing to persuasiveness. On the
contrary, character contains almost the strongest proof of all, so
to speak. (Aristotle, 1991, 1356a)
This passage says several things encouraging for VTA. Firstly, the “character of
the speaker” and the “disposition of the audience” have been made equal part-
ners with what is actually said. Secondly, the particular relevance of character to
“questions where precision is impossible and two views can be maintained” indi-
cates we are concerned with informal reasoning, and more narrowly, pro and con
arguments, or “conductive argumentation” (Blair and Johnson, 2011). VTA are
likewise aimed at informal argumentation. And, at the very least, this passage
shows Aristotle taking ethotic argument very seriously: “almost the strongest
proof of all”. As Gregory Beabout comments on this passage, “In other words,
the pursuit of mastery in the art of rhetoric involves practicing the virtues of
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character and intellect. In order to be persuasive, a speaker must know how,
in the speech, to present oneself as a trustworthy person with good judgment”
(Beabout, 2013, 161).
This passage also raises an intriguing issue: proofs from character “must come
about in the course of the speech, not from the speaker’s being believed in ad-
vance to be of a certain character”. There’s quite a lot to be said about this.
Firstly, there seems to be some tension with the concern with the speaker’s repu-
tation that we saw exhibited in Topics VIII. Perhaps this should not be surprising:
as Janja Žmavc points out, Aristotle is also at odds with an earlier conception
of ethos, sometimes referred to as âπιεÐκεια, as revealing an already established
character (Žmavc, 2012, 184). This suggests that Aristotle departed in the Rhetoric
from a traditional view he had implicitly endorsed in earlier work. (More ten-
tatively, an analogy might be drawn between the temporally united conception
of ethos in the Rhetoric and the unities of time and place proposed in the Poetics
(Butcher, 1951, 1451a32).) Some modern authors explicitly deploy both concep-
tions of ethos. For example, Ruth Amossy: “the pragmatists’ ethos, descended
from Aristotle, is constructed within verbal interaction and is purely internal to
discourse; the sociologists’ ethos, on the other hand, is inscribed in a symbolic
exchange governed by social mechanisms and external institutional positions . . .
however, these two approaches can be complementary rather than conflictual”
(Amossy, 2001, 5).
Aristotle’s exclusion of prior ethos seems a departure from some (tacit) as-
sumptions in VTA, but maybe a valuable one. One immediate argument in favour
of a no track-record approach is that track record requires keeping track! That
is, it would simplify the process of character-based argument evaluation if only
immediately available character aspects need be taken into account. Moreover, as
we saw above, VTA must reject the twentieth-century textbook tradition that any
reference to an arguer’s character is automatically an ad hominem fallacy. But
that’s not to say that ad hominem arguments are never fallacious; rather, we now
need to draw a line between the fallacious and non-fallacious cases. Aristotle’s
no track-record constraint may inspire a compromise proposal for the location
of that line: reference your interlocutor’s character all you please, but only as it
is presented on this occasion—no harping back to previous encounters. How-
ever, this may be too restrictive: perhaps some legitimate ad hominem arguments
would be ruled fallacious. Consider this example from Larry Powers: “I would
strongly urge that you not listen to him. You know in advance that his argument
is going to sound extremely convincing and compelling. His arguments always
sound extremely convincing and compelling, quite independently of the truth or
falsity of what he is arguing for” (Powers, 1998, emphases added). Powers de-
fends the extreme position that no ad hominem arguments are fallacious, but one
need not endorse that position to see that track record might be relevant to the
determination of whether an ad hominem argument is legitimate.
Furthermore, a no track-record constraint may raise difficulties for the defini-
tion of argument. Communication theorists speak of “serial arguments”: argu-
ments that basically go on forever, like a couple who have been arguing about
whose turn it is to do the washing up for forty years (Trapp and Hoff, 1985).
There are many examples of such interminable arguments: the same participants
engaging each other on the same issues over a long period, often with the same
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manoeuvres. If aspects of a speaker’s character revealed in a serial argument are
fair game throughout that argument, then track record seems to be back. Indeed,
one serial argument might outlast several regular arguments; why should track
record be admissible in the former but not the (more temporally united) latter?
Indeed, the VTA-adjacent argumentation theorist Michael Gilbert has explicitly
endorsed a track-record account of ethos: “An individual’s ethotic rating [ER]
comes first and most assuredly from previous interactions. Even when encoun-
tering someone for the first time the associations they carry, the context they bear,
and the situation in which that encounter ensues all form a basis for at least a pre-
liminary ER. Who introduced you, the purpose of the meeting, it’s importance
to you, the initial power standings of those involved, all serve to create an initial
tentative ER” (Gilbert, 2015, 468). On balance, this seems the best way forward
for a treatment of ethos in VTA.
2.3. Rhetoric II. Everything in the above passage from I.2 is consistent with an
account of character as veridical. That is, it could be construed as assuming that
the audience’s perception of the speaker’s character is always an accurate one.
Less so the next passage, from II.1, which displays a greater emphasis on audience
perception of character as something potentially distinct from the speaker’s actual
character:
But since the objective of rhetoric is judgement (for men give
judgement on political issues and a court case is a judgement),
we must have regard not only to the speech being demonstrative
and persuasive, but also to establishing the speaker himself as of a
certain type and bringing the giver of judgement into a certain condi-
tion. For this makes a great difference as regards proof, especially
in deliberative oratory, but also in court cases—this appearance
of the speaker as to be of a certain kind and his making the audi-
ence suppose that he is disposed in a certain way towards them,
and in addition the condition that they are disposed in a certain
way to him. Now the appearance of the speaker to have a certain
character is more useful for political oratory, and the given dispo-
sition of the audience for the courts. For things do not seem the
same to those who love and those who hate, nor to those who are
angry and those who are calm, but either altogether different or
different in magnitude. For to the friend the man about whom he
is giving judgement seems either to have committed no offence
or a minor one, while for the enemy it is the opposite. And to the
man who is enthusiastic and optimistic, if what is to come is to
be pleasant, it seems to be both likely to come about and likely to
be good, while to the indifferent or depressed man it seems the
opposite.
There are three causes of the speakers themselves being per-
suasive; for that is the number of the sources of proof other than
demonstration. They are common sense [φρìνησις], virtue [ρετ ]
and goodwill [εÖνοια]. For men lie about what they are urging
or claiming through either all or some of the following: they ei-
ther have the wrong opinions through stupidity, or, while having
the correct opinions through perversity they fail to say what they
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think; or they have common sense and integrity but are not well-
disposed, whence they might not give the best advice, though
they know it; and there are no other causes besides. So it must
be that the man who is thought to have all of our first list is per-
suasive to the audience. Now the means of appearing to have
common sense and integrity can be drawn from the distinctions
we have given in connection with the virtues. For from the same
points one might make both oneself and another seem to be of
this kind. But about goodwill and friendship we must speak in
the discussion of the emotions. (Aristotle, 1991, 1377b–1378a)
As Antoine Braet observes, the Rhetoric is “a nearly totally descriptive treatise of
the means of persuasion” (Braet, 1992, 316). As such, it need not concern itself
with whether an appearance of virtue may be misleading. But this turn to the
audience perception of character raises a problem for VTA when understood as
making evaluative claims. Even if there was no more to VTA than an exhortation
to argue more virtuously, then recognizing the vices of our interlocutors would
still seem a prerequisite. Aristotle’s solution to this conundrum would be that the
phronimos would not be fooled by a mere appearance of virtue: “it is generally
accepted that the good man’s view is the true one” (Aristotle, 1976, 1176a). (For
a challenge to this aspect of the phronimos, see Baumtrog 2016.)
The main attraction for VTA in this passage is that Aristotle introduces a
threefold analysis of the role of character in argument: “common sense [φρìνη-
σις], virtue [in the moral sense, ρετ ] and goodwill [εÖνοια]”. He then gives us
the flip side of this, the failure modes of these three causes: stupidity, a fail-
ure of φρìνησις; perversity, a failure of ρετ ; and ill-will, a failure of εÖνοια.
For William Fortenbaugh, Aristotle’s use of this threefold account acknowledges
established Greek practice: the division is “a tradition that goes back as far as
Homer” (Fortenbaugh, 1992, 216). As such, he suggests that φρìνησις in partic-
ular should be read in its everyday sense here, “wisdom” generally construed,
rather than as a term of art in Aristotle’s ethical theory (Fortenbaugh, 1992, 220).
If nothing else, this explains how anyone could have φρìνησις and ρετ  but lack
εÖνοια. Nor need we assume that Aristotle’s threefold analysis is exhaustive: “if
ēthotic argument is sometimes justified in nondeliberative contexts, then some
other aspects of ªθος, above and beyond the three mentioned by Aristotle, some
more intellectual ones for example, will be of importance” (Brinton, 1986, 255).
Aristotle also acknowledges in this passage the distorting potential of friendship,
a correlate of εÖνοια; later passages which discuss character suggest the speaker
may be most persuasive by reflecting back the audience’s character, for better
or for worse, “since all men accept speeches directed at their own age and their
kind” (Aristotle, 1991, 1390a). One remedy which VTA might adopt to this issue
would be to constrain ρετ  and εÖνοια to their argumentational aspects.
VTA can productively reflect on all three of the components of character Aris-
totle identifies. I will pay particular attention to φρìνησις in the next section; but
ρετ  and εÖνοια raise issues it does not. In principle, all three could be exem-
plified by the arguer or directly argued for, although in each case “one can bet-
ter suggest ethos than prove it because attempting to prove ethos would produce
doubt about the ethos!” (Braet, 1992, 312). Even so, the arguer may successfully
persuade an audience by exemplifying aspects of ρετ  and εÖνοια that are strictly
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irrelevant to the argument. Goodwill is a neglected feature of argument in both
ancient and modern sources; one ambition for VTA should be to remedy this
oversight. As Alan Brinton observes, “What ρετ  is in a moral advisor, εÖνοια
is in a prudential advisor” (Brinton, 1986, 254 f.). In his apparently independent
account of ethos, mentioned above, Gilbert also proposes a threefold analysis,
in terms of knowledgeability, trustworthiness and likability (Gilbert, 2016, 275).
Each of these components is at least loosely analogous to one of the three Aris-
totelian components: likability is closed allied to goodwill, trustworthiness is a
(moral) virtue, and knowledgeability is at least a component of common sense.
3. Is the phronimos an ideal arguer?
Whether or not the phronesis of the Rhetoric is identical to that of the Nico-
machean Ethics, it is to phronesis in the latter, stronger sense that I turn in this
section. In addition to his well-known roll-call of ethical virtues and their corre-
sponding vices, Aristotle also identifies intellectual virtues: art or technical skill
(τèχνη); scientific knowledge (âπιστ µη); prudence (φρìνησις); wisdom (σοφÐα),
and intelligence (νοÜς) (Aristotle, 1976, 1139b16). Of these virtues, φρìνησις plays
the most central role in this project, since the role which Aristotle assigns to the
phronimos, the person who exemplifies phronesis, most directly connects to the
twenty-first century project of VTA. I think you can make a plausible case that
the phronimos is the exemplar of ideal argumentation. In fact, a plausible case
has already been made, independently of VTA, by Lois Self and Amélie Rorty:
“There are important theoretical and practical relationships between rhetoric and
phronesis and it is the man of practical wisdom who has both the capacity and
incentive to be an ideal practitioner of the Aristotelian art of rhetoric” (Self, 1979,
143); “In short, a brilliant, successful Persuader need not be a phronimos, but
a phronimos must—among other things—rightly as well as successfully exercise
the skills of a talented Persuader” (Rorty, 2011, 733).
They make essentially the same point: that all true phronimoi must be ideal
arguers, but not vice versa: “the Persuader is not, qua rhetorician, a virtuous
phronimos” but “it seems that the phronimos must have the abilities and skills
of the best of Persuaders” (Rorty, 2011, 721). You could master the skills of
the Rhetoric, learn the tricks, without exemplifying the virtue of phronesis. But
that wouldn’t make you an ideal arguer in the full sense; you might have great
technical fluency and sophistication, but you would fall short of being an ideal
arguer because you would be, potentially at least, an unprincipled rogue! “A
Persuader can successfully craft an astute and even insightful legal defense for
an unjust cause, but he does not qualify as a person of practical wisdom unless
his desires and ends are genuinely good” (Rorty, 2011, 732). So the model to
which we ought really to aspire is someone who knows when to use these skills
appropriately. It is that broader, more well-rounded figure of the ideal arguer
that we are trying to advocate for in VTA.
It is an important observation for VTA that there can be more people involved
in an argument than just proponent and respondent; there can also be an au-
dience, an arbiter, and other interested parties (Cohen, 2013, 480). If we accept
that the ideal arguer should be a phronimos, where does that leave the other
parties? This question has given rise to a conflict in the interpretation of Aris-
totle’s work. For Susan Allard-Nelson, “An orator, if confronted by a phronimos,
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could only ‘persuade’ her to do precisely what she would have done, under the
same conditions, anyway. The art of rhetoric, in order to be successful and to
have a meaningful product, is dependent upon an audience composed mainly
of stereotypes (i.e., the average person) and not of the ideal (i.e., the phronimos)”
(Allard-Nelson, 2001, 258); whereas for Arash Abizadeh, “ethical rhetoric appears
to require that phronêsis obtain not just in the rhetorician but additionally in the
audience” (Abizadeh, 2002, 278). On Abizadeh’s account, Aristotle requires the
audience to be phronimoi; on Allard-Nelson’s he requires that they not be. Al-
though Abizadeh does not directly address Allard-Nelson’s work, a resolution to
the apparent inconsistency may be inferred from his account. He proposes that
“the structural constitution of the art of rhetoric produces an internally generated
propensity to induce judgments consistent with the outcomes of phronetic delib-
eration” (ibid.). Rhetoric thereby “enable[s] political institutions to reach correct
outcomes despite the ethical shortcomings of the polity’s members” (ibid.). In
effect, this envisages an epiphenomenal phronimos, distributed over the multiple
participants in a well-conducted dialogue. Hence the paradox is resolved: the
audience has phronesis collectively, but lacks it distributively.
For Aristotle, phronesis is primarily concerned with deliberation, deciding
upon the right course of action. VTA have a broader concern of argumenta-
tion in general, so any special role for phronesis in VTA would require a wider
construal. Such a move is at least consistent with similar steps taken by some
virtue epistemologists: “we ought to consider the virtue of phronesis, or practical
wisdom, as a higher-order virtue that governs the entire range of moral and in-
tellectual virtues” (Zagzebski, 1996, 229). There is an even broader implication:
this privileged role for phronesis lends a privileged role to VTA too, making VTA
necessary for a wide range of other projects. If to properly exemplify phronesis
you need to be an ideal arguer, then VTA will be central to the virtue theory
of anything. In order to properly exemplify the ethical virtues, or the epistemic
virtues, or the virtues specific to any other practice, you would first need to be
an ideal arguer. So there is potential here for an ambitious role for VTA as the
capstone of virtue theories, a common point that they all need to share; that what
the true virtue theory needs to have is an account of arguing in a way that is
conducive to human flourishing (for further discussion, see Aberdein, 2020).
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